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Abstract
In this paper we investigate variations in the economic well-being
of ever-divorced or currently separated mothers with children from an
absent father — a quickly growing and disportionately poor segment of
the population. In large measure, the economic well-being of a divorced
mother depends upon the amount of family support (child support and
alimony) she receives from her ex-husband, her labor force
participation, and how quickly she remarries, if at all. One unique
aspect of our study is that we pay particular attention to the effects
of child support and alimony upon the probabilities of remarriage and
labor force participation. The data set used in our analysis is the
March-April 1979 Match File of the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Within the limitations imposed by our data, we find the likelihood
of being awarded child support depends upon the needs of the mother and
her children, and upon the absent father's long-term ability to pay. In
contrast, the likelihood of receiving child support due depends less
upon the circumstances of the woman, and more upon the current financial
well-being of her ex-husband. His income is found to affect whether or
not any child support is actually paid, but not how much is paid. Like
other forms of nonlabor income, child support payments are found to
lower the probability of remarriage. But unlike other forms of nonlabor
income, child support payments are found to raise labor force
participation.

I. Introduction
Female-headed families are a large and growing proportion of all families.
Special concern for this population stems from the limited amount of resources
available to the family unit. Divorce almost always results in a decline in the
level of living for all parties involved, but the decline is larger for women
than for men (Hoffman, 1979). Female-headed families make up a disproportionate
share of the poverty population and many have little choice but to rely upon the
welfare system (Bradbury, et al
.
, 1979).
Between 1970 and 1981 the number of married-couple families increased
only 10.1 percent while the number of female-headed families increased 62.4
percent, so that by 1981 over 15 percent of all families were headed by a woman
only. This rising rate of female headship is of special concern in part
because female-headed families have lower incomes and are more likely to be
classified as poor than married-couple families. In 1980, the median income of
married-couple families was $23,180 compared to $10,830 for female-headed
families. Of the 6.2 million families with incomes below the poverty level
in that year, almost 3 million were female-headed, a phenomenon recently
dubbed the "feminization of poverty." Female headship also may be of special
concern because of the large number of children involved. Between 1970 and 1980
the number of children living with two parents (not necessarily their natural
ones) declined 20.6 percent, while the number living with one parent
(overwhelmingly their mother) increased 67.1 percent. By 1982, 15.3 percent of
white and 47.2 percent of black children lived with only their mothers. For
most this is a temporary arrangement, since a large majority of divorced women
remarry. However, it has been estimated that "children born in the mid-1970'
s
have about 45 chances in 100 of living in a one-parent family for a period of at
least several months before they reach the age of 18 years."
Most mothers with children from an absent father head their own families at
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least for a time. Figure 1 shows the distribution by household status in April
1979 of mothers agea 18 and over with children (under 21 years of age) from an
absent father. Of these 6.4 million mothers, 5.5 million had previously been
married to the child's father, while 0.9 million had not. Among the ever-
married, 3.5 million are divorced or separated: 3.2 million of these head their
own families and 0.3 million live as subfamilies with parents or other relatives.
Another 2.0 million are remarried and 54 thousand are widowed after remarriage.
Among the never-married, most head their own families. In this paper, we focus
on the two largest of these groups, divorced or separated mothers heading their
own families ana remarried mothers, excluding the widowed.
We investigate variations in several key components of the economic
well-being of ever-divorced or currently separated mothers with children from an
absent father. In large measure, the economic well-being of a divorced mother
depends upon the amount of family support (child support and alimony) she
receives from her ex-husband, her labor force participation, and how ouickly she
remarries, if at all. Whether family support is received or not and how much is
received is subject to considerable uncertainty, both in amount and regularity
of payments. Because many divorced mothers are awarded child support while few
are awarded alimony, we shall devote much more attention to the former. A
divorced mother is more likely to participate in the labor force than a married
mother, since her earnings become crucial to the family's economic status. She
also can seek to improve the position of her family by searching for a new mate
to regain the economic well-being lost by divorce. One unioue aspect of our
study is that we pay particular attention to the effects of child support and
alimony upon the probabilities of remarriage and labor force participation.
Figure 1 also presents four measures of well-being for each household
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status group: average total family income; the percentage of families in
poverty; the percentage of families receiving child support; and the lahor force
participation rate of mothers. In terms of economic status, ever-married are
oetter off than never-married mothers, and remarriage clearly improves economic
status. While the total family income of divorced (or separated) mothers is
only $9678 and 36.2 percent of them live in poverty, family income of remarried
mothers is $23,044 and only 5.6 percent of them live in poverty. The low
economic position of currently divorced compared to remarried mothers occurs
despite a higher proportion of them receiving child support (43.9 compared to
39.0 percent) and participating in the labor force (73.3 compared to 60.6
percent). These figures portray strong economic incentives for divorced mothers
to remarry.
The data set upon which these population estimates are based and from which
our sample is drawn is the March/April 1979 Match File of the Current Population
Survey (CPS). Data on marital status, divorce history and child support and
alimony were collected on all women 18 years of age and older in a special
supplement to the April 1979 CPS. A file was created containing these data along
with the income information from the March 1979 CPS. This file contains 1579
currently divorced or separated female family heads and 1005 remarried mothers.
Population estimates for all mothers eligible for child support and alimony as
well as descriptive analyses of them are presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1981). 9
A divorced mother will be better off if she is awarded and receives child
support, if she participates in the labor force and/or if she remarries. Women
who are awaraed child support are better off than those who are not, and their
income is higher by more than the amount of child support received. In our
sample, the total personal income in 1978 of women awarded child support was
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$7970 of which child support comprised $1115. For those not awarded child
support, total personal income was $5568. The difference is even greater
between those who received child support and those who did not. Total personal
income of those who received child support in 1978 was $9425 while for those
who did not it was $5742. The average amount of child support received for
those who received any was $1901, much less than the difference in income.
Women who participate in the labor market have higher personal income and
receive more child support than those who do not. In 1978, the average personal
income of currently divorced or separated mothers who worked outside the home
was $9,632 while for those who dia not it was $4197; if they worked, they
received $998 in child support but if they did not, only $570. As shown in
Figure 1 above, although remarriage improves the economic well-being of
aivorcea mothers the most, it appears to be associated with less child support
received, $1683 compared to $2021 for currently divorced or separated mothers.
An important question raised by these figures is whether child support
payments have a direct causal effect upon the decision to work and/or remarry,
or whether the observed association is simply simultaneously determined by
other factors? To examine the interrelationships between child support and
these other components of economic well-being, we postulate the theoretical
model presented in Section II. Based upon that model, we examine what factors
influence the awara and receipt of child support in Section III. Then, we
examine the impact of child support payments (holding constant other factors)
upon remarriage in Section IV and upon labor force participation in Section V.
II. Theoretical Framework
Before turning to our empirical work, we offer a short sketch of the
theory upon which our analysis is based. We posit the following recursive
system:
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Tne first equation says that child support due (CSDUE) is a function of a
vector of characteristics of the ex-husband's ability (and desire) to pay
(H-"-), the financial needs of the woman and children (W 1 ) and the legal
environment at divorce (!_') . The second eouation says that support actually
received (CSREC) depends upon the same three vectors of variables (H2
,
W,
and L2 ) as well as upon the amount of support due. We label these vectors
with different superscripts to suggest that they may contain somewhat different
elements from those in the first eouation. For example, W* may measure the
judge's perception of the woman's needs, while W measures the ex-husband's
perception of her needs. A priori W could depend in part upon the woman's
current marital status (RM), but in our empirical work we offer evidence that
this effect is limited. Past work (Gordon, Jones and Sawhill, 1978; Cassetty,
1978) finds that the effect of H2 upon CSREC is particularly strong, where
H2 refers to the absent father's current financial status, measured perhaps
by his current income or current employment status. L 2 includes child
support enforcement laws which vary from state to state.
Equation 3 states that the probability a divorced woman remarries (RM)
depends negatively upon her real income (monetary plus nonmonetary) while
divorced (Y
Q ) ) positively upon her expected real income if remarried (Y ),
ano negatively upon the costs of marital search (C). Since child support
payments are supposed to continue even after a woman remarries, CSREC enters
both Y
d an(j y although a priori we allow expected receipts to vary with
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marital status (CSREC
d and CSRECr ). Ceteris paribus , an increase in child
support payments will reduce the expected increase in income from remarriage
(because, although portable, child support payments are a larger fraction of
Y
d than of Yr ), but will raise the woman's attractiveness to potential
marriage partners. Therefore, the net impact of child support on remarriage
is ambiguous. It should be noted that public assistance benefits may be
another important component of Y .
The final equation states that the probability a divorced woman is in the
labor force (LF^) depends negatively upon the value of her time at home
( w
n ), positively upon the value of her time in the market (Wm ), and
negatively upon nonlabor income (Vd ), which itself depends upon child support
payments (CSREC
d ). if a woman uses child support payments to purchase for
her children market goods which can be substituted for her home time, then
w
n may depend negatively upon CSRECd . In this case, the net effect of an
increase in CSREC^ n LFd is ambiguous: it raises Vd which reduces
Lfr
d , but it lowers Wh which raises LFd .
To summarize, economic theory cannot determine the net impact of child
support payments on either the probability of remarriage or the probability of
labor force participation. Instead, this remains to be determined by
empirical analysis.
III. Empirical Analysis of Child Support
Child support payments are in many cases an uncertain and inadequate
source of income to divorced mothers. In this section, we examine what
factors determine whether a woman is awarded child support, and then given its
award whether she actually receives it, as well as how much she receives. Our
study significantly improves upon previous studies of child support (Cassetty,
1973; Gordon, Jones and Sawhill, 1978; and Sorensen and MacDonald, 1981)
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by separating the question of award from receipt and by use of a large
national data set sampling the entire eligible population.
Excluding observations with missing values, our sample consists of up to
2416 ever-divorced or currently separated women (18 years of age or over) with
children (under 21 years of age) from an absent father. There are 389 black
women and 2027 nonblacks, of which 7 percent are of Spanish origin. At
divorce or separation, 72.6 percent of these women were awaraed child
support—77.5 percent of nonblacks and 47.6 percent of blacks. For those
who were due payment in 1978 the average amount due annually was $2028.
Of these, 71.4 percent received partial or full payments averaging $1899.
While the large majority of those due support received at least partial
payment, 45.4 percent reported receiving no payments or irregular payments.
Means and standard deviations for various characteristics of this sample are
summarized in the Appendix, Table A-l.
In this section, we estimate determinants of the award and receipt of
child support for currently divorced or separated and remarried women
together. z Because black women are much less likely than nonblack women to
be awarded child support, we estimate the determinants of award probability
separately by race. However, in analyzing the receipt of child support, we
combine blacks and nonblacks because too few blacks are awarded child support
to justify separate analysis. * The variables used in the regression
equations are defined in the Appendix, Table A-2.
Jeterminants of the Probability of Being Awarded Child Support
Chila support awards may be either court-ordered or informally agreed to,
although even most voluntary agreements are formalized through legal contracts.
Our theoretical analysis postulates that child support is more likely to be
awarded the greater is tne perceived need of the woman and children, and the
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greater is the ability (or desire) of the absent father to pay. The
probability of award also depends upon the legal environment at divorce which
varies from state to state and over time, and may vary within a state across
legal jurisdictions, as well as across individual judges. There is some
evidence that in states with no-fault divorce laws, the amount of child
support awarded is lower than in states without no-fault divorce (Peters,
1982) . For our sample we have only some of the information that would be
desirable on the needs of the mother and on the ability of the father to pay,
and no information on the legal environment.
Let P be the probability that child support is agreed to or awarded
conditional upon a woman being ever-divorced or currently separated. Then the
logistic function
P = 1/(1 + e~ 6X
~u
) (5)
was estimated by maximum likelihood methods, where X is a vector of independ-
ent variables and 8 a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Table 1 presents
the estimated partial derivatives of P with respect to each variable, found by
multiplying the estimated B's by P(l-P), where P is the mean of the dependent
variable.
Variables which may reflect the new family's financial need include the
mother's age at divorce (AGEDIV), education (EDUC and COLLGRAD), number of
children by the absent father (PATERNR) and age of the children (KID6T017).
While no direct information is available on the father's financial status at
the time of divorce, his ex-wife's age (at divorce) and education will be
positively correlated with his own and, conseouently, with his ability to pay.
Another proxy for his ability to pay is the value of the property settlement
reached in the divorce proceedings (SETVAL). Finally, geographic location
variables (NEAST, NCENTR, SOUTH, SMSA, and CC) may control for some of the
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variation in the legal environment that we are unable to capture.
It is important to distinguish divorced from separated (SEP) women in our
sample. Fourteen percent of the nonolacks are currently separated, while 48
percent of the blacks are separated. Separated women may, but are less likely
to, be awardea child support. According to our estimates, ceteris paribus
,
separated nonblack (black) women are 21 (29) percent less likely than
comparable divorced women to have been awarded child support.
For nonblacks, the probability of being awarded child support increases as
the number of aependent children increases (PATERNR), by 4.1 to 4.7 percent per
chila, ana as one or more of tnese children tends to be older (KID6T017). For
the black sample, however, neither variable is significant.
EDUC is positive for both groups but significant only for nonblacks. In
addition, the dummy variable COLLGRAD is negative and significant for non-
blacks, suggesting that college educated women are between 2.5 and 5.0 percent
less likely than otherwise similar high school graduates to be awarded child
support. As noted above, EDUC may serve both as a proxy for ex-husband's
lifetime earnings potential and as a measure of the new family's financial
needs. Although more education may enable a woman to support the children by
herself, thereby reducing needs, it also raises the standard of living to which
the family is accustomed, thereby increasing needs. The positive sign on EDUC
may reflect both this second effect as well as her ex-husband's ability to pay,
while the negative coefficient on COLLGRAD may reflect the competing
effect of a lower need for support.
The coefficient on the woman's age at divorce (AGEDIV) is positive for
both races and significant for blacks. In part, her age is again a proxy for
her ex-husbano's ability to provide support. (It appears to be a better proxy
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for income of black ex-husbands than is her education.) But in addition, the
variable is strongly positively correlated with the duration of the
marriage. *-> Longer marriages may be more likely to result in child support
awards for several reasons. Chief among them is that the father is likely to
be more attached to his children and therefore more disposed toward providing
them support. A longer duration of marriage might also suggest that the woman
has invested more in this marriage, developing greater marriage-specific
capital (Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977) and specialized more in home
activities, developing less human capital valued in the market. Thus, she
woula be less able to support the children.
In neither racial sample of ever-divorced women is the dummy variable on
current marital status (REMAR) significant. This result is important, since it
suggests that women who have remarried do not possess some unobserved traits
that make them systematically more or less likely to be awarded child support
at the time of their divorce.
For a slightly smaller sample of women, we were able to include an index
of the value of property settlements (SETVAL) as a proxy variable for the
financial well-being of the couple before divorce. Since property settlements
and child support awards are determined together, the coefficient on SETVAL may
be biased if any unobservable factors which affect the value of property
settlements also affect the probability of being awarded child support. To the
extent that SETVAL is a good proxy, its significant positive coefficient for
both racial groups reinforces the hypothesis that father's ability to pay (and
the original family's standard of living) is a strong determinant of child
support awaras. Note that the inclusion of SETVAL reduces the coefficients on
EDUC and AGEDIV, also proxies for father's ability to pay.
-11-
For the sample of all women both awaroed child support and expecting to
receive it in 1978, we estimated eouations on factors determining the amount
due (results not shown), with a few notable exceptions, factors that determine
whether or not child support is awarded also affect the amount due. Few child
support awards are automatically indexed to the rising price level (Krause,
1981, p. 24) and most are infreouently renegotiated; thus, we controlled for
the number of years since the divorce (YEARSDIV) and found its coefficient to
be negative and significant. We also introduced as an explanatory variable the
woman's estimate of her ex-husband's current income (HUSINC); this considerably
reduces the sample size because many women do not know HUSINC.-'- 6 While the
results from this smaller sample may be biased because of this self-selection,
the means of the independent variables (reported in Table A-l) changed very
little. We found the coefficient on HUSINC positive and significant, suggesting
that each adaitional $5000 in the absent father's 1978 income raises child
support due by $219. The coefficient on EDUC declines in size, but remains
significant, suggesting that EDUC stands for more than just his current ability
to pay. We nave argued that it serves as a proxy for his lifetime earnings
potential upon which the support award is likely to be based. It may also
indicate a higher standard of living to which the family is accustomed.
Determinants of the Probability of Receiving Child Support
and of the Amount Received
Not all women due child support actually receive it. Of those expecting
payment in 1978, only 71. A percent received any. Moreover, those who receive
it frequently receive less than what is due. Among women receiving some
support, the mean receipt was $1899 out of the $2204 due them, around 86
percent. In this section we offer some evidence that the probability of
actually receiving child support, unlike its award, depends less upon the needs
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of the woman, and more upon the current financial status of her ex-husband.
This problem consists of two related issues: first, whether a divorced
mother receives any child support and second, how much she receives. This
second issue introduces the possibility of sample selection bias: estimates of
the determinants of support received may be biased if some omitted factors that
determine whether the woman gets into the sample (i.e., receives any child
support) also determine how much she receives. To correct for this sample
selection bias, we use a technique developed by Heckman (1979) which eliminates
the bias by introducing a new independent variable A (negatively related to the
probability of receiving child support) into the regressions on amount of child
support received. Using maximum likelihood probit, first we estimate
determinants of the probability of receiving any child support in 1978,
conditional upon some payment being due. Estimated partial derivatives of
these factors are presented in cols. 1-3 of Table 2. Next we use the probit
estimates to compute a x-value for each mother who receives any child support,
and enter it in OLS regressions on child support received, holding constant the
amount due. These results appear in cols. 4-6 of Table 2. Because
previous researchers did not explicitly recognize the possibility of sample
selection bias, their regression results on factors affecting child support
received may be biased (see, for example, Cassetty, 1978).
Ex poste
, we find only limited evidence of sample selection bias: the
coefficient on x is insignificantly different from zero in both cols. A and 5
and only significant at a 10 percent level in col. 6. The negative sign on X
in col. 6 indicates that omitted factors which lower the probability of receiv-
ing chilo support (and therefore increase x) also lower the amount received.
Black women are less likely to receive child support and, when they do,
receive less than nonblack women, even after controlling for the lower amount
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they are due. However, these differences become insignificant for blacks who
know their ex-husband's income. Although women of Spanish origin are eaually
likely to receive child support as non-Spanish women, they do receive
significantly less child support. The coefficient on SPANISH becomes even more
negative for those few who know their ex-husband's income.
EDUC, AGE and AGESQ may serve as proxies for the absent father's ability
to pay. Education has a positive impact on the likelihood of payment but not
on the amount. Advancing age increases both the probability of receiving
payment and the amount paid at a decreasing rate (reminiscent of the manner in
which earnings change with age). When HUSINC is included, these proxies for
ability to pay become insignificant or less significant in the probability of
receipt eguation (col. 3), but age remains significant in the eauation on the
amount received (col. 6). Although HUSINC significantly increases the
likelihood of payment, it has no significant effect upon the amount paid once
we control for the amount due. Thus, we conclude that while the absent
father's income is an important determinant of the amount of child support
awarded (each $5000 increment raises the amount by $219) and of whether or not
ne pays anything, it is not an important determinant of the portion of the
award that he pays. This suggests that fathers with negative transitory income
are likely to evade the support obligation altogether rather than pay a smaller
portion of the amount due.
°
Three measures of the impact of children are included. Holding constant
the length of time since the divorce (YEARSDIV), having older children
(KID6T017) increases the probability of receiving support, consistent with the
hypothesis that absent fathers are more likely to pay support for children whom
they lived with longer. As the number of children due support increases
(PATERNR), the probability that support will be paid appears to decline although
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this effect is significant only in the equation in col. 2. This result is
difficult to explain. If the woman has other children not fathered by her most
recent ex-husband (OTHERKID), this significantly reduces by 7 to 9 percent the
probability that he pays child support. This result is more understandable.
Given the amount due, neither the number nor ages of the children affects the
amount of support received, except in the sample that knows HUSINC. This group
(col. 6) receives $83 more for eacn additional child but $253 less for older
chilaren, another result that is difficult to explain.
Women were asked whether their child support awards were court-ordered or
agreed to voluntarily. Those reporting voluntary agreements (CSVOL) are between
15 and 22 percent more likely to receive payments; however, given the amount
agreed to, the effect of CSVOL on the amount received is positive but insignif-
icant. Apparently voluntary initial agreement, which probably indicates some-
thing about the character of the father or of the relationship, has lasting
effects.
If the marriage that ended in divorce was not the woman's first, her
likelihood of receiving payment is reduced for each higher-order marriage
(NUMMAR) oy around 8.5 percent, at least when controlling for her ex-husband's
income. Moreover, she receives up to $204 less support per higher-order
marriage, controlling for the amount due. This is especially interesting in
light of the finding that women in higher-order marriages seem to negotiate
somewhat higher support awards (results not shown).
Absent fathers reported by their ex-wives to have other children to support
(HUSCHD) are no less likely to pay child support. While new children may reduce
his ability to support absent ones, the father's decision to remarry and have
more cnilaren suggests he values family life and is apt to be more conscientious
about providing support for his absent children. Because of these
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competing effects, the insignificance of HUSCHD does not disturb our hypothesis
that the probability of receiving child support is largely a function of the
absent father's ability to pay. 20
The variable YEARSDIV has a significant negative effect upon the
probability of receiving child support, but not on the proportion received.
Each additional year since the divorce reduces the probability of receiving
support by approximately 2 percent. This relationship appears to be linear.
The absent father may be less likely to pay support with each passing year if
he loses physical or emotional contact with his children. (We have no
information on whether he has visitation rights.) This explanation is
reinforced by noting that the coefficient on YEARSDIV is much smaller in
magnitude for the sample of women who know HUSINC, women who may be presumed
not to have lost complete contact with their ex-husbands.
Whether the woman is remarried (REMAR) does not affect the likelihood she
receives any child support, but does appear to lower the dollar amount she
receives by up to $159, except for those (remarried) women who know
HUSINC. 2 -1- This suggests that when his ex-wife remarries, the absent father
may reduce somewhat the amount of child support he pays, but not attempt to
renegotiate the amount due (REMAR is insignificant in the eouation on amount
due—results not shown), nor stop paying altogether (REMAR is insignificant in
cols. 1-3 of Table 2). However, another possibility is that our regression
suffers from reverse causality: women who receive less of the support they are
due may be more likely to remarry. We examine this possibility in the next
section.
IV. Empirical Analysis of Remarriage
Tne majority of women in the United States who divorce eventually remarry.
For example, in the 1979 CPS, 70 percent of divorced mothers remarried within
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15 years of their divorce. This identical remarriage rate for divorced women
was found in the 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) data by Becker,
Landes, and Michael (1977). In the CPS, one-half of all mothers remarried
within 5 years of their divorce, and 29 percent within 2 years. 22
The modern theory of job search has recently been applied to marital
search by, among others, Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) and Hutchens
(1979). Briefly, the probability of remarriage depends upon a woman's own
searcn behavior and upon her attractiveness to potential marriage partners. A
aivorced woman can decide whetner or not to engage in search, how intensively
to searcn, and how long to search. These decisions depend upon her expected
gain frdm remarriage which is a function of her expected future flow of real
income if single compared to her distribution of offers of real income if
remarried, net of search costs. A divorced woman's distribution of offers will
depend upon her attractiveness to potential mates, which will be a function of
some characteristics we can observe such as age, some we cannot observe such as
charm or beauty, and the amount of "marital -specific" capital (investments that
are significantly less valuable when aivorced, such as children) from her
previous marriage. As Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977, p. 1155) point out,
"positive" specific capital in one marriage may be "negative" specific capital
in a subseauent marriage.
Some factors affect her search behavior and her attractiveness to others
in opposite directions making it difficult to determine their net effect upon
the probability of remarriage a priori . One example is a woman's portable
(carries into marriage) nonwage income. A higher income if single would reduce
the gain from remarriage which might cause a woman to choose not to search or
to search less intensely and longer. However, it also enhances her
attractiveness to potential spouses, causing an increase in the mean of the
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offer distribution. This would tend to increase her probability of participa-
tion in search, and have an indeterminant impact on intensity and duration of
search (Hutchens, 1979, p. 371). Hutchens cites Becker's theoretical analysis
(1973, p. 891) as evidence that the latter effect tends to dominate the former.
Thus, greater portable nonwage income is expected to increase both the
probability of participation in and the duration of search.
The presence of children is another factor with competing effects. The
greater the number of children, ceteris paribus , the greater the economic gain
from remarriage; thus, the woman is likely to set lower standards for a new
husband and to search more intensely. However, this greater specific capital
from the previous marriage also reduces her attractiveness to potential
marriage partners which decreases the number and mean value of marriage offers.
We hypothesize that women will remarry ouickly if they are either
unusually attractive to potential mates or have established a low "reservation"
set of characteristics for a new husband. Similarly, women will take longer to
remarry (or never remarry) if they are either less attractive partners or have
set a higher standard for a new husband.
We related the probability of remarriage by the nth year after termination
of the previous marriage (n = 2, 5, 10 and 15) to the expected gain from
remarriage. We selected our sample so that all women were divorced (excludes
separated) at least n_ years. (Thus, each successive sample is smaller than the
previous one.) We estimated a logistic function for each sample by maximum
likelihood methods. Results for the n = 15 group are not shown because that
sample contains less than 150 observations and because most of these women had
remarried by n = 10. Partial derivatives of the logistic function with respect
to each independent variable, evaluated at the sample mean, for divorce
durations of 2, 5 and 10 years are reported in Table 3.
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A higher age at divorce (AGEDIV) significantly reduces the probability of
remarriage of divorced mothers at all three durations. The increase in the
size of the coefficient with each successive duration suggests that age at
divorce becomes an increasingly important determinant of remarriage probabil-
ities at higher durations, possibly because it reduces a woman's attractiveness
as a marriage partner. The greater her number of previous marriages (NUMMAR),
the less likely a woman is to remarry, holding AGEDIV constant. Ceteris
paribus , a greater number of previous marriages might reduce her attractive-
ness to potential marriage partners or her inclination to try again. Again,
this effect becomes larger at higher durations.
We might expect to find a secular rise in the probability of remarriage
because the divorce rate has been increasing, which makes available a greater
pool of potential mates and reduces the stigma associated with being a divorced
woman. Indeed, we find that for durations of 5 and 10 years, given AGEDIV, the
more recent the divorce (the lower YEARSDIV), the more likely is a woman to
remarry. This effect is significant in the regressions in columns 3 and 5.
As discussed above, a greater number of children (PATERNR) will have the
competing effects of raising search intensity but lowering potential marriage
offers. (The former effect may be mitigated by the fact that a greater number
of children probably increases her costs of search and reduces her need for
additional companionship.) We find that the probability of remarriage within 2
years of divorce (col. 1) increases as the number of children increases up to 4
and decreases thereafter. The woman may have set her reservation standard
low in order to remarry Quickly for her children's sake, but too many children
make it difficult to attract offers. At higher durations, the effect is
linear: each additional child reduces the probability of remarriage within 5
years by 3.9 percent (col. 2) ana within 10 years by 9.6 percent (col. 4).
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When we control for chilo support due per child (PCCSDUE), the coefficient on
PATERNR is still negative and significant at both durations. This suggests
that what is unattractive about a greater number of children is more than just
the cost of caring for them. The increase in the size of the coefficient on
PATERNR with increasing divorce duration suggests that the woman's
attractiveness as a marriage partner becomes an increasingly important
determinant of remarriage the longer she has been divorced.
Alimony is nonportable income; that is, it stops with remarriage. As
such, it should have a negative effect upon the probability of remarriage.
AWARDAL is negative at all divorce durations, becomes larger at higher
durations, but is significant only at 10 years in the regression controlling
for child support due (col. 5). Women awarded alimony are 8.2 percent less
likely to have remarried 5 years after divorce and 16.2 percent less likely
10 years after. This finding is consistent with findings by Hutchens (1979,
p. 377) that nonportable transfers tend to reduce remarriage probabilities.
Unfortunately, this is the only information about alimony we have that is
relevant to the remarriage decision.
Child support income is legally portable between the single and married
status. As such, it has the competing effects discussed above of decreasing
the gain from remarriage but of increasing the woman's attractiveness to
potential mates; therefore, theoretically its effect upon remarriage is
indeterminate. Where Hutchens (1979, p. 377) was unable to draw any conclusions
on the relationship between portable nonwage income and remarriage, we are able
to do so. Two additional considerations make it likely that child support
income will aecrease the gain from remarriage more than other income. First, if
a divorced mother spends child support income on the children, in part on goods
and services substitutable for child care time, then it reduces the benefits
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to be derived from the sexual division of labor in the care of children.
Second, although legally portable, in practice child support income may be only
partly portable. We showed in Table 2 that for otherwise identical women due
the same amount of child support, remarried women receive up to $159 less
support than divorced women. If fully anticipated, this reduction in payments
would serve to further reduce the expected gain from remarriage.
Women awarded child support (AWARDCS) are 5.3 percent less likely to
remarry within the first 2 years after divorce, but this effect is significant
only at the 10 percent level (col. 1). If not awarded child support, a woman
stands to gain a great deal more from a auick remarriage than a woman awarded
support. Consequently, she may search more intensely and set lower standards
for a new husband.
In the equations in columns 3 and 5, we add measures of whether child
support was due in 1978 (CHSUP78) and of the amount of child support due per
child (PCCSDUE). Women both awarded child support and to whom it was due in
1978 were 3.9 percent less likely to have remarried 5 years after the
termination of their previous marriage and 11.1 percent less likely 10 years
after than women not awarded child support. For those awarded and due child
support in 1978, each additional $500 due per child reduces the probability of
remarriage within 5 years by 4.2 percent. Within 10 years, the effect is
smaller and statistically insignificant. On net, child support income reduces
the gain from remarriage more than it increases the woman's attractiveness to
potential mates, probably because several factors work in this direction.
Thus, we conclude from these findings on child support that this type of
portable nonwage income reduces the probability of remarriage.
Holding constant whether and how much child support is due in 1978, AWARDCS
becomes positive and significant. Women awarded child support but due none in
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1978 (around 20 percent of the sample) are 18-19 percent more likely to remarry
than women not awarded support, even though women both awarded and due support
are less likely to remarry. If a woman is due child support, or due more
support, she searches longer before remarrying, and may not remarry at all.
But, if her child support income stops she is much more likely to remarry than
if it were never awarded at all.
Two otner variables that have the competing effects of reducing the woman's
gain from remarriage but of increasing her attractiveness to others are her
wealth at divorce (SETVAL) and her education (EDUC). SETVAL is insignificant
in all regressions; EDUC is consistently negative, but significant only at the
10 percent level for durations of 2 and 5 years.
AFDC and other public assistance benefits available to single mothers are
other important forms of nonportable income which would reduce the gain from
remarriage and prolong the duration of divorce. Because remarriage occurs in
many different years in our sample, we have no simple measure of the relevant
public assistance benefits when each woman was deciding upon remarriage.
However, some of our variables may be interpreted as proxies for the likelihood
a divorced woman received AFDC. For example, by 5 years after termination of
the marriage, black women (BLACK) are 32 percent less likely to have remarried
than similar nonblack women. If black women, women in the northeast (NEAST) or
in central cities (CO, and women with many children are somewhat more likely
AFDC candidates than other women, then our results support previous findings
(Hutchens, 1979) that welfare reduces the probability of remarriage.
V. Empirical Analysis of Labor Force Participation
Although differences in female labor force participation rates have
narrowed recently, unmarried women are still more likely to be in the labor
force than married women. Among our sample of 1503 currently divorced or
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separated mothers, 73.9 percent were either working or looking for work in
March 1979, compared with 60.3 percent of our sample of 936 remarried
mothers. The greater labor force attachment of divorced mothers is an obvious
response to their loss of other family income. In this section we examine
factors affecting the variation in labor force participation rates among
divorced mothers, paying special attention to the influence of family
support—child support and alimony.
The probability of labor force participation should depend negatively
upon the value of a woman's time at home, positively upon the value of her
time in the market, and negatively upon nonlabor income. The presence of
younger children or more children raises her time value at home, while
education and job experience raise her value more in the market than in the
home. In addition, if market work imposes fixed entry costs, then a woman may
elect not to participate unless her desired hours of employment exceed some
critical minimum. And since hours of work depend negatively upon nonlabor
income, a ceteris paribus increase in such income should reduce the likelihood
a woman participates in the labor force. For divorced mothers, most nonlabor
income consists of income from property, earnings of other family members,
public welfare, and alimony and child support payments from her ex-husband.
In contrast to the other sources of nonlabor income, child support
payments might exert an additional and opposite influence upon labor force
participation. Since this income is awarded to support the children, a woman
may feel explicitly or implicitly constrained to spend it entirely on goods
and services for them. If these commodities (such as day-care for small
cniloren) can substitute for her own home time, then she may be able to reduce
her hours of work in the home, and raise her desired hours of employment
beyono the critical minimum required for labor force entry. If this occurs,
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then the net impact of child support payments on labor force participation is
ambiguous. On the one hand, child support has an income effect of raising
leisure, reducing desired hours of work, and therefore reducing the probability
of labor force participation. On the other hand, child support has a substi-
tution effect of increasing the quantity of goods devoted to children,
decreasing the amount of time spent on them, and therefore raising the
likelihood of labor force participation.
Table 4 reports estimated partial derivatives from logistic models on
factors affecting the likelihood of labor force participation in March 1979
for our sample of divorced mothers. All three variations contain the same
economic and demographic variables but different child support and alimony
variables. The coefficients on the common set of independent variables change
very little across functional forms.
The pattern of coefficients on the number of children under 18 years by
age groups is consistent with findings from studies for married, spouse-present
women (Smith, 1980). Compared with having at home one child age 18 to 20,
having one child age 6 to 17 (KIDLT18) reduces the probability of participation
by 3 percent; having one child age 3 to 5 (KIDLT6) reduces participation
another 6 percent; and having one child under 3 (KIDLT3) reduces participation
another 13 percent. Small children raise the value of the woman's home time
and reduce her likelihood of labor force entry. Each additional adult in the
household (NADULT) who might share in child care duties increases her labor
force participation by up to A. 5 percent.
As the woman becomes more valuable in the market, her labor force
participation increases. Each additional year of education (EDUC) raises her
entry probability by over 5 percent. Advancing age (and presumably
experience) raises entry at a declining rate (AGE is positive and AGESQ is
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negative). Finally, women who have been divorced a longer time (YEARSDIV) are
less likely to enter the job market. This result appears counterintuitive if
labor market entry is viewed as one possible way to restore economic well-being
lost at divorce (where remarriage is another possible way). One explanation
consistent with this result is that mothers who are likely candidates for
public assistance and therefore less likely to be working remain divorced (or
separated) for a longer time than do other mothers to maintain their
eligibility. Alternatively, this result may reflect the secular trend toward
rising labor force participation among younger (more recently divorced) women.
Black women (BLACK) are around 8 percent and women of Spanish origin
(SPANISH) around 10 percent less likely to participate in the labor force than
other divorced mothers. This may reflect cultural differences and/or discrimi-
nation against minority women in the labor market. Women in the northeast
(NEAST) are 12 to 13 percent less likely than other women to participate,
while women in central cities (CC) are 6 percent less likely to participate.
Since women with these characteristics make up a disproportionate share of the
AFDC population, these results also suggest that an increased likelihood of
being on public assistance reduces labor force participation, findings
consistent with those of other studies such as Keeley et al . (1978).
AFDCMAX eouals the maximum amount of monthly AFDC payments that a woman
with a given number of children in a particular state could receive if she does
not work (and has no other income) as of July 1978. (Data on AFDCMAX were
obtained from Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1979.) In other
words, it represents potential, not actual, welfare benefits. Generous public
assistance benefits, ceteris paribus
,
should be expected to reduce labor force
participation. Our finding indicates that each additional $100 per month in
benefits reduces the likelihood of labor force participation by around 5
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percent. When these potential benefits are replaced by actual benefits
received, the regression fits even better but it then suffers from an obvious
simultaneity bias. 25
As expected, the coefficient on other family income excluding child
support, alimony, and public assistance (OTHFINC) is negative and significant;
each additional $1000 in annual income deters labor market entry by slightly
more than 1 percent. The coefficient on amount of alimony due (ALIMDUE) is
also negative and significant, but each additional $1000 of alimony deters
entry by 2.7 percent (col. 1). Controlling for whether or not alimony is due
in 1978 (ALIM78), the coefficient on amount received (ALIMREC) is virtually
identical to the one on ALIMDUE (col. 2). One reason that alimony appears to
reduce participation more than other income is that its coefficient may be
biased downward. Women awarded alimony are probably less likely to have
worked in the labor market during their marriage and thus, with less previous
job experience, less likely to be working now. Therefore, the coefficient on
alimony may reflect both an income effect and an "experience" effect.
Unlike alimony, child support income appears to be positively associated
with labor force participation. This is consistent with past work
demonstrating a positive simple correlation between labor force participation
and the receipt of child support (Grossman and Hayghe, 1982), but extends it
by showing that even when other characteristics (such as race, age, education,
and family size) are held constant, the positive association persists. The
coefficient of .0000305 on CHSUPDUE (col. 1) indicates that among women due
child support in 1978, one who is due the average amount (slightly over $2100)
is 6.4 percent more likely to participate in the labor force than an otherwise
identical woman due no child support. Furthermore, each additional $1000 of
support due raises participation by 3.0 percent. The positive sign is
-26-
consistent with our hypothesis that child support payments are used to
purchase goods and services that substitute for mother's home time and thus
facilitate her labor force participation.
In cols. 2 and 3, we enter alternative measures of child support due
and/or received. Women due child support in 1978 (CHSUP78) are 11 to 14
percent more likely to participate in the labor force than women not due
support. One reason why this effect appears so large is that the coefficient
on CHSUP78 may be biased upward. At divorce, women who anticipate future
labor force participation may seek to obtain child support, which is nontaxable
income, instead of alimony, which is taxable. Once we control for whether it
is due, the amount of child support received (CHSUPREC) has no significant
additional effect on participation (col. 2). However, for the 58 percent of
divorced mothers due child support in 1978 who received it regularly
(CSREGULR), the difference in labor force participation over women due no
support is 6.1 percent less, but this effect is insignificant (col. 3). This
suggests that the uncertainty created by receiving child support payments on
an irregular basis may cause a greater increase in the labor force
participation of divorced mothers than if payment were regular.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
In this section we summarize our most important findings and discuss
their implications for the formation of public policy. Also, we suggest
promising directions for future research.
Like other forms of nonlabor income, child support payments were found
to lower the probability of remarriage. But unlike other forms of nonlabor
income, child support payments were found to raise labor force participation.
Each of these findings is consistent with our hypothesis that child support
income serves as a substitute for the absent father. If a divorced mother
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receives child support, her economic incentive to remarry is reduced. This
allows her to increase the duration of marital search which should improve the
duality of the match and thus the likelihood that the new marriage will last.
In addition to these long-run benefits, child support payments also increase a
divorced woman's labor force participation, which raises her family's income
and well-being in the short-run. Thus, child support payments are found to
have both immediate and future benefits.
It is interesting to contrast the effects of child support, a private
transfer, with AFDC payments, a public transfer. Previous work (Hutchens,
1979) has found that AFDC reduces remarriage rates, just as we found that
child support does. Other previous work (Keeley et al
.
, 1978) has found that
AFDC reduces labor force participation unlike our finding that child support
raises participation. While this may be evidence that child support income
does not create the same work disincentive as AFDC, it is also possible that
women not awarded child support, who are more likely candidates for AFDC,
exhibit a fundamentally different response to nonwage income.
Within the limitations imposed by our data, we found that somewhat
different factors affect the award of child support than its receipt. The
likelihood of being awarded child support depends upon the needs of the mother
and her children, and upon the absent father's long-term ability to pay.
There appears also to be substantial racial differences: black women are less
likely to be awarded support. In contrast, the likelihood of receiving child
support due depends less upon race or the circumstances of the woman, and more
upon the current financial well-being of the ex-husband. His income was found
to affect whether or not any child support is actually paid, but not how much
is paid. Apparently, absent fathers with low current incomes evade payment
altogether, instead of partially cutting back on payments. This suggests that
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one effective strategy for child support enforcement may be to get nonpaying
fathers to pay at least some portion of the child support they owe.
Given the beneficial effects of child support upon the well-being of
female-headed families, it is unfortunate that such support is not awarded to
or received by more divorced mothers and their children. Recent state and
federal legislation have attempted to improve the enforcement of existing
child support contracts. In future work we plan to study the effects of these
new laws on child support receipts. However, no degree of enforcement can
improve the well-being of a family never awarded child support in the first
place. More effort needs to be placed on improving the system of awards.
Initial work in this direction has been accomplished by Garfinkel (1982). Our
analysis of determinants may help to provide a foundation for improving both
the enforcement and award of child support.
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Notes
1. Statistical Abstract 1982-83 , Table 60.
2. Statistical Abstract 1982-83
, Table 717.
3. Statistical Abstract 1982-83 , Table 735.
4. National Organization of Women President, Judy Goldsmith, New York Times
,
September 1, 1983.
5. Current Population Reports
, Series P-20, No. 380, p. 5.
6. Glick and Norton (1977).
7. The idea for this figure comes from Bradbury et al . (1979).
8. Subfamilies pose special problems of income sharing that we cannot readily
handle. Never-married mothers differ in significant ways from ever-married
mothers and thus must be considerea separately. Women who are widowed after
remarriage form a small group whose economic position may depend more upon
their current circumstances than upon having been divorced.
9. The population estimates published in that report differ slightly from the
ones we report in Figure 1.
10. Black mothers are significantly less likely to be awarded support even after
controlling for other factors.
11. Around 17.2 percent of all mothers—16.8 percent of nonblacks and 21.6 percent
of blacks—awarded child support were not due any in 1978 for a variety of
reasons such as death of the previous spouse and children past the age of
eligibility for support.
12. In separate regression equations we found no systematic differences between
them in the estimated coefficients.
13. Equations estimated for the nonblack sample alone are nearly identical to those
for all races combined, with the notable exception that the black intercept
dummy is usually significant in the combined sample.
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14. It would be especially desirable to have some direct information on the
financial circumstances of the father at the time of divorce. For our sample,
it is not possible to find a simple measure of the legal environment at divorce
Decause tne divorce year varies from 1945 to 1979. Ten percent of the sample
were divorced in 1965 or earlier and 29 percent in 1970 or earlier. We could
not in any case account for the individual variation from judge to judge in a
study at the national level. For a study that takes account of such variation
in a single state, see Chambers, 1979.
15. We also estimated this equation for the sample of currently divorced (or
separated) women only for which we know marriage duration. When we enter it
as an independent variable in place of AGEDIV, its coefficient is positive and
significant for nonblacks, but insignificant for blacks.
16. This variable is believed to be subject to considerable measurement error,
which would increase its standard error. It is thus surprising that it turns
out as significant as it does.
17. The sample means (and standard deviations) for these a variables are as
follows:
x(l) .4l4(.246)
A(2)
.378C.281)
\(3) .289C.212).
18. In a separate regression, we included child support due (CHSUPDUE) as an
explanatory variable. Holding HUSINC constant, its coefficient is small but
significantly positive: each additional $100 of support due increases the
probability that some support will be received by two-tenths of one percent.
If the absent father's permanent or lifetime income contributes positively to
the amount of child support awarded, then the significance of both CHSUPDUE and
HUSINC in the same regression could indicate that his permanent income
(CHSUPDUE) and current income (HUSINC) have separate effects upon his
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probability of paying support. Holding current income constant, absent
fathers with higher permanent income are somewhat more likely to pay support.
Holding permanent income constant, fathers with higher current income are much
more likely to pay support. Again this is consistent with the hypothesis that
current ability to pay has a strong impact upon child support payments.
19. Cassetty (1978) found that absent fathers who remarried were no more likely to
pay child support, but paid significantly more. Since she does not control for
amount due, her findings on amount received confound determinants of award
amount with receipt amount, and thus are not directly comparable to ours.
20. Another reason why this coefficient is insignificant may be that this variable
is measured with error.
21. Our results would appear to disagree with those of Cassetty (1978) who finds
that remarried women are less likely to receive child support and also receive
less child support. However, her dependent variable combines child support
and alimony income together. Since alimony stops with remarriage while child
support is supposed to continue, her results would inevitably be negatively
biased. We are fortunate to have data that enable us to separate child
support from alimony income.
22. In the 1967 SEO, only 43 percent of women remarried within 5 years and 22
percent within 2 years. Either divorced mothers remarry more rapidly than
divorced women in general, or there has been a secular trend since 1967 toward
shorter intervals between divorce and remarriage. We offer some evidence of
the latter effect in our empirical estimates.
23. Had we restricted our sample to remarriages that took place within say the
last 2 years instead of n_ years after divorce, we could have included measures
of AFDC (as did Hutchens, 1979). But for the problem we are interested in our
specification (similar to that of Becker, Landes, and Michael, 1977) is more
appropriate.
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24. We also estimated equations with labor force participation for any part of
1978 as the dependent variable. The results
—
particularly on the child
support and alimony variables—were virtually identical.
25. In addition, the size and significance of the coefficients on BLACK, SPANISH,
NEAST, CC, KIDLT3, KIDLT6, KIDLT18, and YEARSDIV are reduced. This is
consistent with our notion that each of these variables serves in part as a
proxy for the probability of going on public assistance.
26. However, for a sample of recently divorced (or separated) mothers for whom we
are able to control for whether or not they were in the labor force prior to
the termination of their marriage (in March 1975), the coefficient on alimony
due is virtually identical to the one reported here, suggesting that the
"experience" bias may be negligible for this particular sample.
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9Mothers with Children from
an Absent Father
6,372
13,321
30.
A
37.0
66.5
Ever-married
Mothers
5,510
14,492
25.2
41.8
68.4
Never-married
Mothers
862
5,331
63.3
6.2
54.0
Widowed after
Remarriage
54
11,213
34.1
13.5
37.1
Female
-
Sub-Family
Head Head
853 9
5,875 1,764
63.1 86.1
6.2 0.0
53.9 59.7
Sq^ : Tabulation s by authors from the computer tapes of the March-April Match File of thei*79 Current Population Survey.
IGJRE 1. MOTHERS 18 AND OVER WITH CHILDREN FROM AN ABSENT FATHER IN 1979: NUMBER OF WOMENUN THOUSANDS)
;
AVERAGE TOTAL FAMILY INCOME; PERCENTAGE IN POVERTY; PERCENTAGE RECEIVING
-HILD SUPPORT; LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE.
Table 1
Effect of Selected Factors on the Probability that Child Support
is Awarded for All Ever-Divorced or Currently Separated Women,
Age 18 and Over, with Own Children Under 21 Years of Age from
an Absent Father as of Spring 1979, by Racea
Independent Variable
Nonblack
(1) (2)
Black
(3) (4)
EDUC
COLLGRAD
SPANISHb
NEAST
NCENTR
SOUTH
SMSA
CC
PATERNR
KID6T017
NUMMAR
REMAR
AGED IV
.025
(4.91)
.019
(3.60)
.020
(1.67)
.016
(1.27)
- .125
(2.79)
- .126
(2.60)
.022
(0.14)
.027
(0.17)
-
.088
(2.46)
-
.089
(2.44)
• • • • • •
-
.086
(3.00)
-
.074
(2.44)
- .055
(0.54)
- .092
(0.88)
.018
(0.64)
.004
(0.10)
- .040
(0.41)
-
.063
(0.63)
-
.055
(2.06)
-
.059
(2.10)
- .058
(0.65)
-
.069
(0.76)
.014
(0.60)
.008
(0.32)
.160
(1.61)
.155
(1.53)
-
.024
(0.88)
- .016
(0.55)
- .179
(2.16)
- .170
(2.00)
.047
(4.01)
.041
(3.38)
.022
(1.02)
.019
(0.84)
.053
(2.28)
.042
(1.69)
.025
(0.30)
.017
(0.20)
- .033
(1.38)
- .024
(0.96)
.042
(0.50)
.053
(0.64)
- .040
(1.69)
- .023
(0.91)
- .073
(0.86)
-
.094
(1.06)
.001
(0.84)
- .001
(0.39)
.008
(2.33)
.006
(1.68)
Table 1—continued
Nonblack Black
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
SEP - .207
(7.50)
- .129
(4.39)
-
.291
(4.62)
-
.207
(3.13)
SETVAL • • • .094
(6.90)
• • • .151
(2.51)
Constant - .097
(1.13)
- .051
(0.57)
- .439
(1.70)
-
.389
(1.49)
Likelihood Ratio Test
(Chi-sq) 180.9 241.7 48.6 49.8
N 2027 1907 389 373
Mean of Depenaent Variable .775 .769 .476 .453
aThe logistic function P = 1/(1 + e~ bX"u ) was estimated by maximum
likelihood methods and the coefficients reported above are BP(l-P) where P is
the mean of the dependent variable reported in the last row of the table.
Asymptotic t-values are shown in parentheses.
^SPANISH was omitted from the equation for blacks because less than 1 percent
of the sample was Spanish.
Table 2
Effect of Selected Factors on the Probability that Child Support is Received
and on the Amount of Child Support Received by Ever-Divorced Women
Probability of Receiving
Child Support
Amount of Child Support
Received
(1)' (2)' (3)
: (4)' (5)' (6)'
BLACK -.101
(2.69)
-.123
(3.03)
-.043
(0.73)
SPANISH -.030
(0.61)
-.020
(0.38)
-.104
(1.39)
NEAST .082
(2.36)
.081
(2.23)
.094
(1.99)
NCENTR .055
(1.85)
.065
(2.12)
.110
(2.83)
SOUTH .042
(1.43)
.047
(1.50)
.060
(1.55)
SMSA -.018
(0.70)
-.015
(0.54)
-.045
(1.35)
CC .010
(0.32)
.012
(0.36)
.079
(1.84)
EDUC .015
(2.87)
.016
(2.89)
.013
(1.90)
AGE .027
(2.66)
.022
(2.05)
.005
(0.46)
AGESQ -.0003
(2.12)
-.0002
(1.52)
-.0001
(0.45)
PMTERNR -.012
(1.05)
-.026
(2.13)
-.022
(1.54)
OTHERKID -.079
(2.78)
-.069
(2.35)
-.087
(2.35)
KID6T017 .066
(2.02)
.087
(2.55)
.072
(1.76)
CSVOL .222
(8.33)
.221
(8.03)
.155
(4.55)
NUMMAR
-.045
(1.59)
-.039
(1.40)
-.085
(2.73)
299
(2.49)
-259
(1.70)
- 56
(0.38)
346
(2.83)
-406
(3.02)
-926
(3.60)
177
(1.30)
170
(1.71)
107
(0.84)
50
(0.67)
- 5
(0.05)
-139
(1.08)
114
(1.58)
- 71
(0.90)
- 90
(0.88)
39
(0.66)
18
(0.29)
- 67
(0.77)
90
(1.30)
95
(1.29)
30
(0.26)
0.2
(0.02)
6
(0.36)
- 22
(1.12)
59
(1.95)
67
(2.27)
59
(2.03)
-0.6
(1.64)
-0.7
(1.90)
-0.6
(1.61)
18
(0.63)
- 13
(0.38)
83
(2.03)
89
(1.01)
49
(0.51)
140
(1.06)
64
(0.74)
- 20
(0.19)
-253
(2.18)
173
(1.23)
271
(1.63)
- 31
(0.22)
198
(2.69)
-204
(2.74)
-180
(1.47)
Table 2—continued
Probability of Receiving
Child Support
Amount of Child Support
Received
(l) a (2)
a
(3)
a
(4)
c
(5)
C
(6)
C
YEARSDIV -.020
(6.94)
-.020
(5.88)
-.011
(2.63)
- 7
(0.42)
- 15
(0.84)
21
(1.39)
REMAR -.008
(0.30)
-.005
(0.17)
-.028
(0.80)
-159
(2.63)
-123
(1.92)
- 53
(0.62)
HUSCHD • • • -.012
(0.48)
• • « • • • - 41
(0.66)
• • •
HUSINC • • • • • • .027
(3.33)
• • • • • • -2.96
(0.10)
CHSUPDUE • • • • • • • • • 0.891
(80.1)
0.897
(79.2)
0.930
(61.6)
X(l) b • • • • • • • • • 198
(0.45)
• • • • • •
A(2) b • • • • • • • • • • • • 433
(0.82)
• • •
X(3) D • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • -1000
(1.70)
Constant -.521
(2.89)
-.430
(2.30)
-.068
(0.32)
-1199
(1.51)
-1547
(1.88)
-574
(0.86)
R
2
• • • • • • • • • .877 .886 .901
Likelihood
Ratio Test 219.0 624.2 270.2 • • • • • • • • •
N 1461 1259 648 1043 931 521
Mean of Dependent
Variable .714 .739 .804 $1899 $1918 $2146
aThe coefficients reported in these columns are the probit maximum likelihood
estimates (b) multiplied by the sample mean of normal density functions evaluated at
X^s, where Xj_ is the vector of independent variables for the i^n observation.
These sample means are .297 for col. 1, .280 for col. 2, and .232 for col. 3.
b
> = f(XiS)/F(Xj_6), where f and F are, respectively, the density and distribution
function for a standard normal variable, and X^ and B are defined as in footnote a.
See Heckman (1979), p. 156.
cSince we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selection bias (i.e., that the
coefficient on X is zero), the usual OLS standard errors and t-statistics are
appropriate. See Heckman (1979), p. 158.
Table 3
Factors Affecting the Probability of Remarriage, by Duration of Time
Since the End of Previous Marriage3
Duration of Time Since End of Previous Marriage (in years)
Independent 2 5 10
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EDUC -.010
(1.78)
-.014
(1.89)
-.011
(1.47)
-.010
(0.97)
-.008
(0.73)
BLACK -.215
(4.20)
-.312
(5.21)
-.320
(5.46)
-.178
(2.25)
-.149
(1.93)
SPANISH -.042
(0.73)
-.107
(1.44)
-.120
(1.58)
.097
(0.87)
.105
(0.91)
NEAST -.081
(2.04)
-.122
(2.33)
-.116
(2.27)
-.115
(1.53)
-.081
(1.08)
NCENTR .001
(0.00)
-.024
(0.53)
-.052
(1.15)
.043
(0.61)
.036
(0.53)
SOUTH .003
(0.10)
-.025
(0.56)
-.035
(0.79)
.089
(1.25)
.105
(1.49)
SMSA -.036
(1.26)
-.067
(1.69)
-.042
(1.08)
-.038
(0.61)
-.018
(0.30)
CC -.049
(1.39)
-.107
(2.31)
-.090
(1.98)
-.230
(3.39)
-.221
(3.29)
PATERNR .116
(2.16)
-.039
(2.19)
-.042
(2.35)
-.096
(3.49)
-.082
(2.99)
PATSQ -.024
(2.16)
• • • • • • • • •
AGEDIV -.012
(6.24)
-.017
(6.59)
-.019
(7.63)
-.021
(5.24)
-.023
(5.78)
YEARSDIV -.0002
(0.10)
-.004
(1.09)
-.012
(2.93)
-.009
(1.31)
-.017
(2.44)
NUMMAR -.052
(1.45)
-.168
(3.22)
-.142
(2.71)
-.253
(3.08)
-.237
(2.85)
AWARDAL -.007
(0.20)
-.041
(0.81)
-.082
(1.59)
-.105
(1.28)
-.162
(2.02)
Table 3—continued
Duration of Time Since End of Previous Marriage (in years)
Independent 2 5 10
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SETVAL -.007
(0.69)
.002
(0.17)
• • • -.006
(0.26)
• • •
AWARDCS -.053
(1.72)
-.042
(1.00)
.188
(3.42)
-.047
(0.80)
.180
(2.39)
CHSUP78 • • • • • -.227
(3.81)
• • • -.291
(3.40)
PCC5DUE • • • • • • -.834*
(2.53)
io--4
• • •
.327*10-A
(0.66)
Constant .350
(3.00)
1.129
(7.28)
1.202
(7.85)
1.542
(6.01)
1.608
(6.22)
Likelihooa Ratio
Test (Cni-sq) 123.2 170.0 237.1 112.2 132.0
N 1570 1069 1150 474 500
Mean of Dependent
Variable .298 .512 .504 .658 .656
aSee note a in Table 1.
Table 4
Factors Affecting the Likelihood of Laoor ^orce Participation of Currently
Divorced (or Separated) Women in March 1979a
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
BLACK
SPANISH
NEAST
NCENTR
SOUTH
SMSA
CC
KIDLT3
KIDLT6
KIDLT18
NUMMAR
EDUC
NADULT
AGE
AGESQ
-.085
(2.31)
-.076
(2.05)
-.076
(2.06)
-.101
(1.99)
-.103
(2.02)
-.105
(2.06)
-.130
(3.36)
-.127
(3.28)
-.126
(3.25)
-.027
(0.70)
-.030
(0.78)
-.033
(0.84)
.015
(0.30)
.028
(0.53)
.025
(0.47)
.021
(0.60)
.019
(0.54)
.019
(0.55)
-.062
(1.73)
-.057
(1.58)
-.059
(1.62)
-.127
(3.21)
-.128
(3.22)
-.128
(3.23)
-.063
(2.19)
-.062
(2.13)
-.062
(2.16)
-.026
(1.81)
-.025
(1.75)
-.025
(1.72)
-.037
(1.27)
-.033
(1.17)
-.040
(1.38)
.053
(8.72)
.053
(8.79)
.052
(8.76)
.044
(1.75)
.045
(1.76)
.044
(1.73)
.023
(2.33)
.023
(2.25)
.024
(2.35)
-.0003
(2.57)
-.0003
(2.43)
-.0003
(2.52)
Table 4—continued
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
YEARSDIV
OTHFINC
AFDCMAX
CHSUPDUE
ALIMDUE
CHSUP78
ALIM78
CHSUPREC
ALIMREC
CSREGULR
Constant
Likelihood Ratio
Test (Chi-sa)
N
-.006
(2.07)
-.006
(2.08)
-.007
(2.19)
-.115*10-4
(2.98)
-.117*10-*
(2.98)
-.120*10-A
(3.04)
-5.35*10"4
(2.77)
-4.84*10-A
(2.51)
-4.87*10-4
(2.52)
.305*10-*
(2.99)
• • • • • •
-.272*10~4
(2.37)
• • • • • •
• • • .113
(3.70)
.144
(4.12)
• • • .006
(0.10)
-.040
(0.88)
• • •
-.016*10"4
(0.17)
• • •
• • •
-.254*10-4
(1.75)
• • •
• • • • • •
-.061
(1.61)
-.448
(2.22)
-.506
(2.49)
-.508
(2.51)
361.8
1503
368.6
1503
368.0
1503
Mean of Dependent Variable .739 .739 .739
aSee note a in Table 1.
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Table A-2
Definition of Variables
AWARDCS = 1 if chila support is awarded and otherwise.
RECCS = 1 if child support is received and otherwise.
EDUC = number of years of school completed by the woman.
COLLGRAD = 1 if woman is a college graduate and otherwise.
SPANISH = 1 if woman is of Spanish origin and otherwise.
NEAST = 1 if woman lives in the northeast and otherwise.
NCENTR = 1 if woman lives in northcentral states and otherwise.
SOUTH = 1 if woman lives in the south and otherwise.
SMSA = 1 if woman lives within an SMSA and otherwise.
CC = 1 if woman lives within the central city of an SMSA and otherwise,
PATERNR = number of children under 21 fathered or adopted by ex-husband who
are living with their mother.
PATSQ = PATERNR squared.
KID6T017 = 1 if there are one or more children age 6 to 17 present and
otherwise.
NUMMAR = number of the marriage that ended in divorce.
REMAR = 1 for remarried women and otherwise.
AGEDIV = woman's age at divorce.
DURMAR = duration of the marriage that ended in divorce.
SEP = 1 for currently separated women and otherwise.
SETVAL = index of property settlement with = none; 1 = less than $5000;
2 = $5000-9999; 3 = $10,000-19,999; 4 = $20,000-29,999;
5 = $30,000-39,999; 6 = $40,000-49,999; 7 = $50,000-74,999;
8 = $75,000 plus.
BLACK = 1 if woman is black and otherwise.
YEARSOIV = years since the divorce.
NEWDIV = 1 if the divorce occurred since January 1978 and otherwise.
Table A-2—continued
HUSCHD = 1 if ex-husband has other children to support and otherwise.
HUSINC = woman's estimate of her ex-husband's income in $5,000 increments,
where 1 equals less than $5000 and 6 equals $25,000 plus.
AGE = woman's current age (April 1979).
AGESQ = AGE squared.
OTHERKID = 1 if woman has any children not fathered by her ex-husband and
otherwise.
CSVOL = 1 if child support was agreed to voluntarily and otherwise.
CHSUPDUE = dollars of child support due in 1978.
CHSUPREC = dollars of child support received in 1978.
CSREGULR = 1 if child support received regularly and otherwise.
AWARDAL = 1 if alimony was awarded.
CHSUP78 = 1 if child support due in 1978 and otherwise.
PCCSDUE = CHSUPDUE/PATERNR.
ALIMDUE = dollars of alimony due in 1978.
ALIM78 = 1 if alimony is due in 1978 and otherwise.
ALIMREC = dollars of alimony received in 1978.
AFDCMAX = maximum monthly AFDC payments by state and number of children.
INLF79 = 1 if woman was working or looking for work in March 1979 and
otherwise.
KIDLT3 = number of children under 3 years old.
KIDLT6 = number of children under 6 years old.
KIDLT18 = number of children under 18 years old.
NADULT = number of adults in the household.
OTHFINC = total family income excluding child support received, alimony
received and public assistance income.


